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This paper merges patent citation data with data on pharmaceutical patent expirations,
generic entry, and pricing to explore the eﬀects of observable patent characteristics on oﬀ-
patent and on-patnet pharmaceutical pricing. Using a sample of drug patents facing generic
entry in the 1990s, I ﬁnd that the price of branded drugs increased on average in the face of
generic entry. Importantly, I ﬁnd that the number of patent citations that a drug receives
from other ﬁrms is correlated with a decrease in markup and a decrease in the duration of
the markup. Conversely, self-citations are correlated with higher prices and slower decay
in prices. The results indicate that patent citations may signal the degree of inter-molecule
substitution. And, importantly, self-citations may indicate a degree of cumulative patenting
that enables a ﬁrm to eﬀectively extend or strengthen the original patent protection. This
research takes a step forward in understanding the distinction between “positive” citations
and “negative” citations related to creative destruction.
JEL: K11, L11, L65.
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In recent years the use of patent citations has proliferated in the economic literature. Patent
citations are widely used in examining patent value, ﬁrm value, innovative performance, and
strategic behavior. Part of the interest in citations is due to the recent availability of patent
citation data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), detailed in Hall,
Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001). That project was undertaken because of a recognition that
simple patent counts are noisy measures of innovative output (Trajtenberg 1990).
One of the common interpretations of patent citations is that they are an indica-
tor of patent value or patent quality. Indeed, several papers have shown that citation-
weighted patent counts are a better measure of innovative output than straight patent
counts (Hagedoorn and Cloodt 2003, Schankerman 1998, Lanjouw and Schankerman 1999).
However, another interpretation of patent citations is that they indicate knowledge
ﬂows and spillovers (see Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) and recent contributions
by Moretti (2004) and Hussler (2004) among others). The knowledge ﬂow interpretation
indicates that downstream patents may build on work by upstream patents so that inno-
vation is cumulative (Scotchmer 1991). As such, citations may not always measure the
current quality or value of the cited patent, but rather the rise of a supplanting technology,
as suggested by Schumpeter’s creative destruction.
This paper merges data on patent citations with data on pharmaceutical entry and
pricing in order to distinguish the value-enhancing and substitution eﬀects signaled by
citations. The paper investigates the usefulness of patent statistics as a way to measure
inter-molecule substitution and intra-molecule protection by drug pioneers. The results
have application outside of pharmaceuticals by demonstrating that the interpretation patent
citations must be handled with care. Additionally, this paper adds to the body of work
showing strategic patenting behavior on the part of innovators (Podolny, Stuart and Hannan
1996, Grindley and Teece 1997, Hall and Ziedonis 2001).
Previous pharmaceutical studies have paid great attention to the protection aﬀorded by
patents. Pharmaceutical products are undoubtedly fertile markets in which to investigate
the eﬀect of patent protection by comparing on-patent and oﬀ-patent pricing. Unlike mar-
kets like electronics, patented pharmaceutical products are fairly well-deﬁned, and generic
entry is relatively easy to measure. Despite being the very basis of market power in phar-
1maceuticals, little attention has been paid to the observable characteristics of the patents
themselves. Part of the reason is certainly the data requirements: to examine the eﬀects
of expiring patents, one must include in the sample patents granted 20 years prior. Rich
patent data are available only since the mid-1970s. Thus, until recently, it was not feasible
to examine detailed patent statistics in combination with post-patent pricing and entry.
Several papers have examined the eﬀect of generic entry on pioneer drug pricing after
patent protection expires. The empirical results indicate that pioneer prices may either
rise or fall in the face of generic competition. For instance, both Grabowski and Vernon
(1992) and Frank and Salkever (1997) ﬁnd that branded prices increase after generic entry.
In contrast, Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) and Wiggins and Maness (1994) ﬁnd a
negative impact of generic competition on branded price. The accepted explanation for
branded price increases lies in market segmentation: when faced with generic competition,
pioneers may either compete against the generics for price sensitive consumers, or they
may forego the price sensitive segment of the market in favor of selling to brand-loyalists.
Thus, depending on the strategy that the pioneer ﬁrm employs, we can expect to see
prices either decrease or increase. In reality, many pioneer ﬁrms begin manufacturing and
selling their own generic versions of the drug in order to price discriminate based on brand
loyalty. In any case, while pioneer prices may rise or fall when faced with generic entry, a
price premium is generally enjoyed by the pioneer. observe a negative price response. The
accepted theoretical explanation for price increases is that branded drug manufacturers may
practice price discrimination after patent expiration: rather than focus on price-sensitive
consumers, they restrict their sales to brand loyal consumers. Indeed, many manufacturers
produce their own generic versions of their drugs after generic entry–competing on price
with generics, and reserving the brand name product for brand loyalists. In any case,
whether prices increase or decrease in response to generic entry the branded drug enjoys a
price premium over generics, and pioneer proﬁts decrease.
I examine on- and oﬀ-patent pricing using a sample of drugs facing generic entry in
the 1990s. The paper provides two primary contributions to the existing literature on
pharmaceutical entry. First, I exploit the observable characteristics of the patents that were
the basis of monopoly power and brand recognition for the drugs in my sample. Second, I
explore the dynamics drug pricing using a hazard speciﬁcation.
I ﬁnd that the price of branded drugs in my sample increased on average in the face of
2generic entry. Additionally, I ﬁnd that the number of patent citations that a drug receives
from other ﬁrms is correlated with a decrease in markup, and a decrease in the duration of
the markup. Conversely, the number of patent citations that a manufacturer makes to its
own drug patent (“self-citations”) is correlated with higher prices and slower decay in prices.
The results imply that forward citations by other ﬁrms signal the degree of inter-molecule
substitution, and self-citations correspond to the degree a pioneer is able to further protect
its original substance by “fencing” the patent in with follow-on patents. The follow-on
patents generally cover new forms of the substance (e.g., oral versus injectible forms or
extended release capsules), but may also include new processes that enable cheaper produc-
tion of the substance. Thus follow-on patenting softens the blow of the patent expiration on
the molecule. This research takes an important step in understanding strategic cumulative
patenting, as well as understanding the distinct diﬀerences between forward citations and
self-citations.
In the following section, I present the econometric speciﬁcation. Next, I describe the
pharmaceutical data and patent data in my sample. Section (4) presents the results of the
estimations, and Section (5) concludes and discusses possible extensions.
2S p e c i ﬁcation
My speciﬁcation utilizes a simple product diﬀerentiation framework in order to estimate a
relationship between branded drug price and generic entry and substitution. From the ﬁrst








p is the Lerner index, p and c are the price and marginal cost, respectively,
s is the market share relative to generic production, and ε is the molecule-speciﬁcd e m a n d
elasticity. In the case of pharmaceuticals, the pioneer manufacturer generally has some
brand name recognition that diﬀerentiates it from generic competitors, even after patent
expiration.
I assume an inverse demand function of p = p(q + θg) where q is the quantity of the
branded drug, g is the quantity of the generic competitor, and θ represents the degree of
substitutability between branded and generic drugs. I also allow for conjectural variations,
3so that
dg





To develop an econometric speciﬁcation for drug i at time t, I take logs and add an error
term uit:
lnLit =l n ( 1+θitλit)+l nεit + uit. (3)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Equation (3) measures the degree of substitutability
with generic manufacturers, or intra-molecule competition. And the second term repre-
sents factors that inﬂuence the ﬁrm-speciﬁc elasticity of the drug, including the availability
of therapeutic substitutes (substitute pharmaceutical compounds–inter-molecule competi-
tion). My estimation equation is a linear approximation,
lnLit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Zit + uit, (4)
where Xit is a matrix of explanatory variables inﬂuencing intra-molecule competition, Zit is
a matrix of explanatory variables inﬂuencing inter-molecule competition. Xit and Zit vary
somewhat across speciﬁcations in Section (4), but the primary variables are discussed here.
For intra-molecule competition, the most important explanatory variable is the number
of generic entrants since patent expiration. As discussed below, I do not have direct obser-
vations on the number of generic competitors or market shares. Instead I use the number
of generic applications (Amended New Drug Applications–ANDAs) at the Food and Drug
Administration. Generic producers are required to submit an ANDA prior to generic man-
ufacture. I treat the cumulative total as a proxy for the degree of potential entry. To the
extent that entry is credible, the number of potential entrants may be a better measure of
competitiveness than observed entry.
For inter-molecule competition, the most important explanatory variable is the number
of forward citations received by the patent, discussed in more detail below. I classify forward
citations into two types: self-citations and citations by others. Self-citations are calculated
from the patent data by multiplying the cumulative forward citation count by the propor-
tion of self-citations. Other citations are the residual. I hypothesize that the number of
citations by others (and the technological closeness of those citations) indicates the number
of potential inter-molecule substitutes, which should increase the molecule speciﬁcd e m a n d
elasticity, εit.
4In calculating the Lerner index, it is necesary to approximate marginal cost. In my
sample, I approximate marginal cost for each branded drug by using the lowest observed
generic price for the drug. The absence of any real cost data is a limitation, but if generics
are competitive and if manufacturing processes are similar, then the lowest observed generic
price during the sample period should well approximate marginal cost. While it might be
expected that the costs of production will change over the life cycle of the drug, it is unlikely
that they will change signiﬁcantly in the neighborhood of the patent expiration; little R&D
goes into improving productivity for drugs that are nearing expiration.
3D a t a
3.1 Drug Sample
My sample of drugs comprises a subset of the drugs found in the Generic Spectra database
from IMS Health. Generic Spectra is a database of over 100 drugs facing patent expiration
and generic entry between 1992 and 2002. The Generic Spectra drugs are listed in Table
(1), along with the availability of entry, price, and patent data. I obtained branded drug
names, molecule names, and patent expiration dates from these data. Patent protection
on pharmaceuticals can vary, and can be supplemented by “exclusivity” granted by special
legislation, e.g., the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (DPCPTR).
The period of exclusivity may or may not outlast patent protection. The Generic Spectra
expiration dates are intended to indicate the earliest date at which generics may enter the
market.
The patents for the Generic Spectra drugs were obtained from the IMS Patent Focus
database. I was able to identify a patent number for 68 pioneer drugs. It should be noted
that a drug may be covered by multiple patents; so, for the purposes of obtaining patent
statistics, I chose the earliest of issued patents. The earliest patent is usually the patent
on the molecule that deﬁnes the drug. Later patents are frequently sought on such things
as drug delivery or form. The usual practice is for subsequent patents on a drug to cite
back to the primary molecule patent. An expired drug may allow for generic competition in
its original form; however, the pioneer ﬁrm may patent an extended release version which
would not immediately be subject to generic competition.
Generic Spectra includes only drugs that experienced some generic entry. These are
5usually drugs with larger markets. Throughout, my results are conditional on some amount
of entry. So, my results on entry relate to the intensity or frequency of entry, not the
likelihood of entry. However, to the extent that the economically important drugs are those
that face generic entry, the restriction is not signiﬁcant.
Table (2) describes the variables used in the study, including some summary statistics.
3.2 Entry
Data on entry were obtained from the FDA’s Orange Book. Each generic entrant for a given
chemical compound must ﬁle an ANDA with the FDA. Filing an ANDA is a necessary but
not suﬃcient condition for entry. In reality the number of entrants represents potential
entry, and will diﬀer from actual entry because I do not observe whether the ﬁrm actually
produces or whether it produces and then exits. But, as mentioned above, to the extent
that entry is easy for a generic manufacturer, it may be that potential entry is a better
measure of competitive pressure than observed entry.
3.3 Prices
Prices for the drugs in the sample were obtained from the ReadyPrice database from
Thomson-Micromedex. The prices listed in this product are Average Wholesale Prices
(AWP), which do not reﬂect any discounts oﬀ the list price. Discounts are common in whole-
sale pharmaceutical markets, so that AWP is referred to as “ain’t what’s paid.” However,
as other researchers have noted, as long as AWP is correlated with the actual discounted
price, the qualitative results in my estimation should not be inﬂuenced by the use of this
proxy (Lu and Comanor 1998). AWP prices are used because they are much more readily
available; revenue and quantity data are expensive to obtain from private data vendors.
Unfortunately, the pricing data are far from complete. The pricing history is not rich for
most drugs, and for many drugs I could not ﬁnd pricing data for either the pioneer, generics,
or both. For simplicity, I restricted pricing data to drugs sold in tablet and capsule form.
This restriction eliminated a few drugs, but enabled me to more easily calculate comparable
prices based on per unit weight. Because I do not have data on the quantity sold in diﬀerent
forms, some simpliﬁcation was necessary.
On a given day, A manufacturer may set diﬀerent prices based on form, dosage, and
package size. Where multiple prices exist on a given day, I calculate a simple average unit
6price1 and a minimum unit price observed on that day.
To calculate a Lerner index, I approximate marginal cost using the minimum price
observed by a generic entrant over the sample period. Thus, I implicitly assume that
marginal cost remains the same over the time period. Again, this assumption is reasonable
if we restrict ourselves to the latter part of a patent’s life. The earliest price data in the
sample come from seven years prior to expiration, and the latest prices are 10 years after
expiration.
3.4 Patent statistics
Patent statistics were obtained from the NBER Patent Citations Data Files (described in
Hall et al. (2001)).
Of primary importance for the current paper are the citation variables. So-called “for-
ward citations” are citations received by the patent from subsequent patents. Forward
citations are frequently associated with higher patent value. The rationale is that if a
patent is frequently cited, then it may be the basis for cumulative innovation, and may
be technologically important. However, higher forward citations may also have a negative
impact on value if citations reﬂect replacement by new technologies.
In the pharmaceutical context, it is likely that both eﬀects occur. More citations will oc-
cur for blockbuster drugs, and they will also occur in crowded therapeutic classes. However,
with regard to pricing in particular, I posit that more citations by other ﬁrms in nearby
technological classes reﬂect the degree of substitutes that exist for this drug. If we deﬁne
blockbuster drugs by the size of the market, then we can expect more citations to reﬂect
larger revenues. But, this does not imply that the Lerner index will necessarily be higher.
To determine the eﬀect on price, it is useful to distinguish between forward citations by
others, and self-citations. The NBER dataset deﬁnes two self-citation variables, reﬂecting
the proportion of forward citations that are made to the patent by the same patent holder.
Since information about the patent holder of citing patents is subject to error, the two self-
citation variables represent the upper and lower bounds (Hall et al. 2001). Missing values
for the self-citation variables will obtain whenever there are no forward citations. In the
estimation, I use the lower bound estimate, and replace missing lower bound values with
1Obviously, if one had revenues, one would prefer to calculate a weighted average rather than a simple
average.
7zero in the event of zero citations.
I use the proportion of self-citations to impute the quantity of self-citations. Self-
citations represent investment by a ﬁrm in a patented line of drugs or related drugs. These
citations indicate either an active eﬀort to protect patent coverage (and thus make substi-
tution harder), or they indicate a response by the ﬁrm to strong patent protection. That
is, the causality is not clear ap r i o r i , but in either case, self-citations are correlated with
more freedom from inter-molecule competition. Similarly, the quantity of other-citations
indicates that other ﬁrms are citing the patent, and potentially providing substitute drugs
or treatments. Both self-citations and other-citations are tracked dynamically. That is, I
track when each citation is made, and keep a cumulative total based on date.
By way of example, Table (3) lists all the patent citations made to patent number
4,267,320, which protected the branded drug Ceftin (cefuroxime axetil) manufactured by
Glaxo. One can observe that the ﬁrst several patent citations are self-citations covering new
forms of the drug. Glaxo continually introduced new forms (e.g., a solid oral form of the
drug rather than the original injectible) and ﬁnally a process patent. Sumitomo’s citation
represents a new chemical that may operate as a therapeutic equivalent to cefuroxime axetil.
Notably, there is a gap in citations that resumes when the patent expires. After expiration,
one can see a ﬂurry of process patents related to manufacturing for the generic producer
Ranbaxy.
Backwards citations, or citations made by the patent to prior patents may also indicate
more substitutes in the therapeutic class. In this case, the citations might not be negative
in that the new drug may usurp the cited drug. So, this substitution eﬀect is likely to be
smaller. Self-citation data are not available easily available for backwards citations.
Hall et al. (2001) describe the creation of two indices in the NBER data using patent
citations: generality and originality (Jaﬀe et al. 1993). The NBER indices are useful for
several reasons. First, they are convenient and available. Additionally–and because of
this–they are being used more frequently in empirical research, so they serve as a useful
benchmark.






where sij refers to the proportion of citations to patent i from patents in technology class j.
8Thus, the higher the index, the more spread out are the patents that cite it, technologically
speaking (Hall et al. 2001). Low generality should be bad news for a branded drug, as it
will indicate citations from a more “focused” technology class, making it more likely that
it is receiving citations from closer substitutes.
Originality is similarly deﬁned, except that sij refers to backwards citations (citations
made by the patent in question) rather than forwards citations (citations received by the
patent in question). Higher originality indicates more diﬀuse backward citations technology
classes, implying (perhaps) that a wider array of technologies were utilized in the innovation.
Both generality and originality are undeﬁned if the number of citations is zero. In my
sample, undeﬁned values are replaced by zero. In the case of generality this redeﬁnition is
justiﬁable in that an uncited patent is not applicable to any patented technologies (yet), and
therefore receives a low score for generality.2 In the case of originality, one could imagine
that highly original patents might cite no previous patents. However, from an empirical
standpoint, Hall et al. (2001) observe that higher numbers of citations tend to be associated
with higher originality and generality indices; thus, assigning zero to undeﬁned values seems
the logical choice.
4 Estimation
In the following subsections, I estimate diﬀerent versions of Equation (4). In Section (4.1) I
estimate ordinary least squares estimates of the price equation, and test for endogeneity. In
Section (4.2) I attempt to control for endogeneity using instrumental variables and simul-
taneous equations methods. Lastly, in Section (4.3), I estimate a hazard rate speciﬁcation
of the likelihood of branded price decreases.3
4.1 Price equations
Table (4) shows the results of estimating Equation (4) using ordinary least squares. The
dependent variable is the log of the Lerner index. In columns (1) to (4), the branded price
used to calculate the Lerner index is the minimum branded price on any given date (L);i n
the last speciﬁcation the average price is used (Lavg).
2Alternatively, the patent may just be very young.
3For the sake of parsimony, I will focus my remarks on the primary variables of interest: price, entry, and
forward citations.
9The ﬁrst noticeable result is that entry is positively correlated with markups. There
are two potential explanations for this result. First, if ﬁrms are attempting to segment
the market by brand loyalty–as discussed in Section (1)–then we would expect to see
price respond positively to entry. However, another possible explanation is endogeneity.
If high prices induce entry, then the positive relationship may result from the bias of a
simultaneously determined system. I will examine endogeneity below.
Throughout all the estimated OLS equations, the log of the number of forward citations
(plus one) by “others” enters signiﬁcantly. In columns (1) and (2) of Table (4), ln(subfor)
is positive, and in columns (3) to (5)–when dummies for the therapeutic categories have
been added–the sign becomes negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The negative sign is
evidence that on average forward citations by others represent potential substitute products,
since greater substitution will lead to lower prices. For this reason I refer to citations by
others as subfor or “substitute” forward citations.
The sign on the log of the number of self-citations (plus one)–ln(selfor)–is positive
throughout, and signiﬁcant at the 1% level when the category dummies are included. The
positive coeﬃcient is consistent with the interpretation of self-citations as representing bar-
riers to (substitute) entry, as discussed in Section (3).
Lastly, generality has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the markup when the categorical
dummies are included. A more general patent indicates that forward citations come from
a wide array of technology classes. If citations tend to be focused from only one class, it
is more likely that these citations are from the same technological class as the drug itself,
representing greater substitutability. Thus, higher generality (less focus) should indicate
less substitution, and a higher price. In fact, the coeﬃcients on ln(subfor) and generality
must be interpreted together: ln(subfor) represents the amount of (potentially) substi-
tute citations, and generality represents the intensity (or lack of intensity) in a particular
technological class.
Because of possible endogeneity between prices and entry, the OLS coeﬃcients cannot be
relied upon. A Durbin—Wu—Hausman test (described in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993))
reveals the presence of endogeneity in the OLS estimates. I regress ln(entrants) on the log
of time since patent expiration (ln(t)), patent characteristics, and the categorical dummies.
The residual from that regression is included in a price equation (column(3) of Table(4)) to
test for endogeneity. The coeﬃcient on the residual is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, indicating
10endogeneity of entry. I employ two approaches to control for the problem: instrumental
variables and simultaneous equations.
4.2 Endogeneity
Table (5) shows the results of the instrumental variables approach, when I instrument with
ln(t). I treat the time since expiration as the identiﬁcation variable because it is more likely
that some entry (generic and substitute) occurs over time, and that the increased entry
impacts price. However, it is unlikely that the passage of time impacts price in a distinct
way.4
The four columns of Table (5) represent speciﬁcations using both ln(L) and ln(Lavg)
as dependent variables. Columns (2) and (4) include category dummies.
Entry fails to be signiﬁcant in any estimation, but the coeﬃcients on ln(subfor), ln(selfor),
and generality continue to be highly signiﬁcant when category dummies are included. The
signs remain the same as in the OLS speciﬁcation.
Table (6) shows the results of two simultaneous equations models. Again, I use both
ln(L) and ln(Lavg) as measures of the markup; these are dependent variables in the price
equations and independent variables in the entry equations. The price equations (columns
(1) and (3)) are identiﬁed by ln(subfor) and ln(selfor). The entry equations are identiﬁed
by ln(t) and offpat (an indicator variable equal to one when the drug is oﬀ-patent).
In the price equations, the signs and signiﬁcance remain the same as in the OLS spec-
iﬁcations. That is, entry again enters positively, and the signs on ln(subfor), ln(selfor),
and generality continue to be negative, positive, and positive, respectively. In the entry
equation, the markup has a positive impact on entry, which is what we should expect,
theoretically. Unreported estimates using the generic markup as an additional explanatory
variable in the entry equation do not alter the coeﬃcients on the citation variables. The
results of the simultaneous equations models support other studies that ﬁnd a positive price
response to entry.
In summary, I ﬁnd my hypotheses conﬁrmed. In particular:
• Self-citations tend to increase the branded markup.
4Clearly it can be argued that drug-speciﬁc demand elasticity will be larger over time. However, this
substitution is likely to take place over the 10 to 15 year that the drug is on-patent. The elasticity in the
post-patent timeframe is likely to be fairly constant.
11• Forward citations by others tend to decrease the branded markup.
• Entry is met by an increase, on average, of the branded markup.
• Generality (less intense technological focus of forward citations) tends to increase the
markup.
Besides the size of the markup, it is interesting to investigate the dynamics of the
branded response to generics. To examine the duration of the markup following entry, I
utilize a duration model.
4.3 Duration
I begin the duration–or hazard rate–analysis by specifying a reduced form model for
the probability of a decrease in the branded price. The hazard function, λ(t), gives the
probability that the pioneer ﬁrm will decrease its price given that it has not decreased its
price in the previous t years. The hazard function is deﬁned as λ(t)=
f(t)
1−F(t), where f(t)
and F(t) are the usual density and cumulative probability functions.
The exponential speciﬁcation assumes a constant hazard: λ(t)=λ, so that the hazard
function does not vary with the duration of the spell. That is, there is no duration depen-
dence; the length of time a ﬁrm has gone without lowering price does not, ceteris paribus,
aﬀect the likelihood of a price decrease in the next interval of time. The hazard rate is
constant in t if the corresponding distribution is exponential.
The Weibull distribution leads to a hazard function of the form λ(t)=λp(λt)p−1.T h i s
hazard function includes the exponential as a special case where p =1 , therefore it is useful
to include it as a comparison. For values of p<1, the hazard function will be decreasing
in time (it will exhibit negative duration dependence). For p>1, the hazard function will
exhibit positive duration dependence. For both the exponential and Weibull models, the
parameter λ is modeled as
λ = eXβ+ε (5)
where X is a matrix of drug and patent characteristics given in Table (2). Some of the
covariates vary over time: notably the current number of entrants, and the number of
substitute citations and self-citations.
12Estimation involves maximum likelihood estimation where the censored observations are






ln(1 − F (t|θ)) (6)
T a b l e( 7 )s h o wt h er e s u l t so ft h eh a z a r de s t i m a t i o nf o rs i xs p e c i ﬁcations. The coeﬃcients
are presented in their exponentiated forms (eβ) so that a value above one indicates a pos-
itive marginal eﬀect, and a value below one indicates a negative marginal eﬀect. Columns
(1) to (3) assume an exponential distribution, and columns (4) to (6) assume a Weibull
distribution. For each speciﬁcation I use three samples: all available time periods, the
on-patent subsample, and the oﬀ-patent subsample. For the on-patent subsamples, generic
e n t r yc a n n o tb eu s e da sa ne x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e .
All speciﬁcations show the same impact of the relevant explanatory variables. The
impact of forward citation variables are consistent with those found in the price equations
in Sections (4.1) and (4.2). The impact of entry is more ambiguous.
The primary ﬁndings are:
• More entry and more substitute citations increase the likelihood that prices will fall.
• More self-citations and higher generality decrease the likelihood that prices will fall.
• The impact of substitute citations and generality is much stronger in the on-patent
sample than in the oﬀ-patent sample.
Regarding entry, it may seem odd that it would lead to higher price markups and faster
price decreases. In an unreported estimation, I perform the same analysis on price increases
and ﬁnd that more entry also leads to an increase in the likelihood that prices will increase.
The explanation is that some drugs will decrease price in the face of generic competition,
and some drugs will increase price;5 regardless of which strategy the ﬁrm follows, it will
follow it faster if there is more entry.
The information regarding forward citations ﬁlls out the picture of the substitution
story. More substitute citations and lower generality will lead to lower prices and speedier
price decreases, while more self-citations will lead to higher prices and a lower likelihood of
price decreases. The interpretation of substitute citations and self-citations as relating to
5On average prices increase–as found in Sections (4.1) and (4.2). But, there is heterogeneity in response.
13inter-molecule substitution more than intra-molecule substitution is bolstered by the fact
that the coeﬃcients are much more extreme in the on-patent sample (where there is no
generic competition) than in the oﬀ-patent sample.
A ﬁnal interesting result is that the scaling parameter in the Weibull speciﬁcations
indicates that there is positive duration dependence. That is, the longer an oﬀ-patent drug
goes without lowering price, the less likely that it is to lower price in the future.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The results presented above are important for the pharmaceutical literature because they
suggest that citations made to the pioneer drug patent by other ﬁrms may be related to
the degree that other products (molecules) compete with the drug. The eﬀects of the
generality index also seems to indicate that more focused forward citations are correlated
with the existence of closer substitutes. Similarly, self-citations may indicate barriers to
entry (or at least strong patent protection), and lead to higher prices. I also ﬁnd that
pioneer drug prices tend to increase when faced with generic entry, supporting the market
segmentation theories of other researchers. Using hazard rate analysis, I show that price
decreases by pioneer ﬁrms exhibit negative duration dependence.
Additionally, the results are important for the patent literature. Researchers have long
been aware that patent citations are a way to measure patent quality or value. However, they
are equally aware that citations may represent a negative impact relative to self-citations
in the form of supplanting technology. Schumpeter’s creative destruction, in fact, relies on
patent citations being a negative indicator, at least on some level. This paper is the ﬁrst to
my knowledge to distinguish empirically between negative citations and positive citations.
The pharmaceutical industry oﬀers a unique opportunity to study citation, because it is
easier to distinguish positive from negative citations, due to the nature of the technology
and the nature of competition.
Lastly, the methodology emphasizes the usefulness of citation data outside of their usual
applications. They are widely available and cheap. So, to the extent that they proxy well for
diﬀerent competitive phenomena–like entry and strategic investment–they can be utilized
as proxies in many contexts.
One caution should be noted in interpreting the results. First, while the interpretation
14of the coeﬃcient estimates is consistent with a substitution story, there is more information
available in the citation data to exploit. Detailed coding of citations, the technologies
involved (compound claims, composition claims, method-of-use claims, and process claims),
and tracking speciﬁcally who cites whom (and why) is a fruitful area for ongoing research.
Extensions in better exploiting patent data should prove proﬁtable and this paper takes
a step in bridging the gap between the empirical patent literature and the pharmaceutical
pricing literature. Patent statistics are a potentially valuable–and largely unexploited–
resource for investigating pricing and competition.
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176T a b l e s
Table 1: List of sample drugs
Category Pioneer Drug Molecule Patent data Generic prices Branded prices Entry data All
analgesics dolobid diflusinal x x x
stadol butorphanol tart x x
toradol ketorolac x x x x x
ultram tramadol x x
anesthetics amidate etomidate x
forane isoflurane x x
sufenta sufentanil x
antiarthritics ansaid flurbiprofen x x x x x
daypro oxaprozin x x x
lodine etodolac x x x x x
naprosyn naproxen x x x x x
orudis ketoprofen x x x x x
relafen nabumetone x x x x x
voltaren diclofenac sodium x x
antibiotics/anti-infectives amikin amikacin x x
ceclor cefaclor x x x x x
ceftin cefuroxime axetil x x x x x
mefoxin cefoxitin x
zinacef cefuroxime x x
antidepressants anafranil clomipramine x x
aventyl nortriptyline x x x
luvox fluvoxamine x x x
prozac fluoxetine x x x x x
vivactil protriptyline x
wellbutrin bupropion x x x x x
antifungal lotrimin clotrimazole x
nizoral ketoconazole x x x x x
antimalarial plaquenil hydroxycholoroquine x x x
antivirals flumadine rimantadine x x x
zovirax acyclovir x x x x x
bile therapy actigall ursodiol x x x
cancer blenoxane bleomycin x
eulexin flutamide x x x x x
hydrea hydroxyurea x x x
mutamycin mitomycin x
nolvadex tamoxifen x x x
taxol paclitaxel x
vepesid etoposide x
cardiovascular betapace sotalol HCL x x x
bumex bumetanide x x x x x
capoten captopril x x x x x
capozide captopril x
cardene nicardipine x x x
cardizem diltiazem x
cardura doxazosin mesylate x x x x x
corgard nadolol x x x x x
dobutrex dobutamine x x
hytrin terazosin x x x x x
lopid gemfibrozil x x x x x
lopressor metoprolol x x
lozol indapamide x x x
mevacor lovastatin x x x x x
mexitil mexiletine x x x x x
primacor milrinone x x
prinivil lisinopril x x x x x
procardia nifedipine x x
questran cholestyramine x
rythmol propafenone HCL x x x
sectral acebutolol x x x x x
tambocor flecainide x x x x x
tenex guanfacine x x x x x
tenoretic atenolol/chlorthalidone x x x
vasotec enalapril maleate x x x x x
visken pindolol x x
wytensin guanabenz x x
zebeta bisoprolol x x x x x
ziac bisoprolol x x x x x
18Category Pioneer Drug Molecule Patent data Generic prices Branded prices Entry data All
dermatological temovate clobetasol propionate x x
diabetes glucophage metformin x x
glucotrol glipzide x x x x x
gastrointestinal axid nizatidine x x x x x
carafate sucralfate x x x
pepcid famotidine x x x x x
prilosec omeprazole x x
tagamet cimetidine x x x x x
zantac ranitidine x x x
hemotological coumadin warfarin sodium x x x
trental pentoxifylire x
inmunological imuran azathioprine x x x
neoral cyclosporine x x x
musculoskeletal aredia pamidronic acid x x
tracrium atracurium besilate x x
zanaflex tizanidine x x x
neurological eldepryl selegiline x x x x x
klonopin clonazepam x
parlodel bromocriptine x x x x x
permax pergolide x x x
sinemet carbidope/levodopa x x
zarontin ethosuximide x
ob/gyn estrace estradiol x x x
ogen estropipate x x x
opthalmics betagan levobunolol x x
betoptic betaxolol x x
neptazane methazolamide x x
propine dipivefrine x x
psychotherapeutics buspar buspirone x x x
clozaril clozapine x x x
cylert pemotine x
versed midazolam HCL x x
xanax alprazolam x x
respiratory atrovent ipratropium x x
intal cromolyn x x
seldane terfenadine x
sedatives halcion triazolam x x
prosom estazolam x x
tuberculosis rifadin rifampin x x x
Counts 68 67 53 102 35
19Table 2: Variables used in estimation
Prices and entry Obs Mean Std. Dev.
pbmin The minimum brand price on a given date. 504 2.09 1.40
pbavg The average brand price on a given date. 504 2.28 1.57
pbdown Indicator variable = 1 if there is a branded price decrease.
pgmin The minimum generic price on a given date. 1235 1.33 0.89
pgavg The average generic price on a given date. 1235 1.52 1.00
cost The minimum of any generic price ever facing the pioneer drug. 3006 0.66 0.70
L Branded Lerner index: (pbmin - cost)/cmin. 503 0.60 0.29
Lavg Branded Lerner index: (pbavg - cost)/cmin. 503 0.63 0.26
entrants Cumulative number of generic applicants. 3829 4.37 6.02
Patents
subfor Cumulative number of forward citations made by other firms. 3304 34.22 38.51
selfor Cumulative number of forward citations made by own firm. 3304 3.71 8.77
general NBER "Generality" index. Undefined values set to 0 3304 0.53 0.16
original NBER "Originality" index. Undefined values set to 0 3304 0.19 0.29
cmade Number of citations made by the patent. 1982 2.95 2.18
offpat Indicator variable = 1 when the patent has expired.
Other
cat dummy variables for pharmaceutical category
t time since patent grant
Table 3: Citations to patent 4,267,320 (Ceftin/Glaxo)
















20Table 4: Ordinary least squares estimation
ln(entrants) 0.238 *** 0.247 *** 0.181 *** 0.195 *** 0.184 ***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
ln(subfor) 0.050 ** 0.048 ** -0.196 *** -0.196 *** -0.169 ***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
ln(selfor) 0.003 0.003 0.106 *** 0.107 *** 0.082 ***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
generality -0.001 -0.008 1.224 *** 1.179 *** 1.004 ***
(0.167) (0.167) (0.172) (0.173) (0.155)
cmade -0.033 ** -0.036 ** -0.055 *** -0.058 *** -0.054 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
originality 0.608 *** 0.624 *** -0.186 -0.159 -0.067
(0.141) (0.141) (0.160) (0.160) (0.143)
ln(t) -0.136 -0.222 -0.164
(0.112) (0.110) (0.098)
Constant -1.222 *** 0.001 -0.976 *** 1.091 0.607
(0.106) (1.018) (0.224) (1.046) (0.937)
Category dummies NNYYY
Observations 358 358 358 358 360
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.58 0.58 0.59
Standard errors in parentheses











Table 5: Instrumental variables estimation
ln(entrants) 0.091 -0.012 0.140 0.031
(0.129) (0.107) (0.113) (0.094)
ln(subfor) 0.086 ** -0.181 *** 0.066 * -0.157 ***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027)
ln(selfor) 0.032 0.178 *** 0.007 0.135 ***
(0.037) (0.048) (0.032) (0.042)
generality 0.081 1.380 *** 0.062 1.152 ***
(0.187) (0.204) (0.161) (0.178)
cmade -0.045 ** -0.066 *** -0.038 ** -0.060 ***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
originality 0.631 *** -0.262 0.585 *** -0.143
(0.147) (0.177) (0.127) (0.155)
Constant -1.081 *** 0.006 -1.036 *** -0.095
(0.163) (0.328) (0.142) (0.286)
Category dummies NY N Y
Observations 358 358 360 360
R-squared 0.23 0.54 0.28 0.56
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ln(entrants) instrumented using ln(t)
lnL lnL lnLavg lnLavg
(3) (4) (1) (2)
21Table 6: Simultaneous equations estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)









generality 1.150*** 0.389 0.941*** 0.359
(0.168) (0.283) (0.151) (0.284)
cmade -0.049*** -0.073*** -0.044*** -0.072***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.013) (0.026)
originality -0.224 0.574** -0.128 0.556**





Constant -0.326 0.000 -0.390 1.239
(0.271) 0.000 (0.242) (1.619)
Category dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 358 358 360 360
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Lerner = L Lerner = Lavg
Table 7: Hazard rate estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All On-patent Off-patent All On-patent Off-patent
ln(entrants) 3.244*** 2.811*** 1.439*** 2.113***
(0.322) (0.494) (0.194) (0.420)
ln(subfor) 1.898*** 19.852*** 1.454*** 1.997*** 3.789** 1.645***
(0.186) (12.083) (0.173) (0.213) (2.274) (0.207)
ln(selfor) 0.827* 0.328*** 0.814* 0.754** 0.226* 0.778*
(0.085) (0.138) (0.098) (0.087) (0.180) (0.102)
generality 0.015*** 0.000*** 0.049*** 0.012*** 0.002** 0.024***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.039) (0.008) (0.004) (0.020)
cmade 1.143** 1.619*** 1.081 1.146** 1.277 1.121
(0.071) (0.288) (0.078) (0.072) (0.204) (0.086)
originality 5.633** 107.233* 4.745* 11.190*** 34.609* 6.557**
(4.206) (283.254) (3.877) (8.891) (70.794) (5.769)
Category dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Scaling parameter 6.819*** 9.867*** 5.415***
0.87 2.07 1.22
Observations 2576 1277 1299 2576 1277 1299
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Exponential distribution Weibull distribution
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